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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No, 900443-CA 
v. j 
FLOYD EUGENE MAESTAS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from judgments entered upon jury 
verdicts convicting Appellant Floyd Eugene Maestas of burglary of 
a dwelling, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-202 (1990), and theft under $100, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). Jurisdiction of 
the Utah Court of Appeals over the appeal is based on Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that 
Defendant was not denied his statutory right to a speedy trial? 
Was Defendant denied the speedy trial guaranteed by the federal 
constitution? Is Defendant's legal argument and analysis on this 
issue adequate to obtain this court's ruling on the 
constitutional issue? 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression of a 
piece of glass taken from Defendant's pocket during booking for a 
warrantless arrest for parole violation, where the arrest was 
made at his girlfriend's home by parole officers who did not 
enter the home? Did the affidavits supporting warrants to seize 
a sample of Defendant's blood and his belongings in the custody 
of the police contain any false statement? Even if so, was it 
material to the issuing magistrates' determinations of probable 
cause? 
3. Was Jury Instruction 13, concerning the State's 
burden of proof and the definition of reasonable doubt, a correct 
statement of the law? 
4. Did the trial court violate Defendant's due process 
rights by refusing to allow his girlfriend to testify whether and 
at what time Defendant had left her home on the afternoon of the 
crimes? Should the court even reach the merits of this 
constitutional claim where Defendant made no proffer of what the 
excluded testimony would have been and did not raise the due 
process issue in the trial court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant does not contend that any of the factual 
findings underlying the trial court's legal conclusions were 
clearly erroneous. The issues raised on appeal present questions 
of law, which this court reviews for correctness with no 
deference to the trial court. State v. Wilcox, 153 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7, 8 (Utah 1991). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief or in the addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
General Facts re Burglary: 
Sylvia Demetropolos, Phyllis Demetropolos, and Helen 
Demetropolos returned home from church at approximately 7:00 p.m. 
on August 21, 1989 (R. 178 at 74). They pulled into their 
driveway, parked the car and went to the back door of their home, 
where they found glass broken out of the window in the top half 
of the back door and a large rock by the door (R. 178 at 76). 
The three sisters entered the house at 1486 South Main Street and 
found blood spattered on the walls of the hallway and kitchen (R. 
178 at 106), broken glass scattered around the enclosed rear 
porch and in the kitchen, food and liquor that had been removed 
from the cupboards and placed on the counter in a bloodied 
plastic bag, a large bloodied piece of broken window glass on the 
kitchen counter, a can of beer in the dining room, and the 
contents of dresser drawers and closets scattered around the 
bedroom (R. 178 at 78-79; 201; 286). Phyliss called 911 to 
report the breaking and entry (R. 178 at 204). Then Helen 
Demetropolos hollered "There he goes" when she saw a shadowy 
figure at the back of the house, silhouetted by the sun coming 
through the west window; she pursued the man out the back door, 
up the driveway and to the neighbor's house (T. 178 at 288; 290). 
She never saw his face head on, only the back of his head (R. 178 
at 291). Sylvia ran toward the telephone at the front door, 
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turned and, along with Phyliss, saw a man go out the back door 
and run up the driveway (R. 178 at 80-81; 204; 287). Phyliss ran 
to the front door, opened it, and started chasing the man down 
the street, yelling to two men across the street that they had 
been burglarized (R. 178 at 205). The men joined her in chasing 
the man for a ways, although she only got within 35 or 40 feet of 
him (R. 178 at 205-06). In the meantime, Sylvia had followed her 
sister out the front door and watched the man run down the street 
until she lost sight of him about four houses away (R. 178 at 
84). When the police arrived shortly thereafter, Sylvia 
described the intruder as being of taller than medium build, 
wearing a striped shirt and blue pants (R. 178 at 86). 
Fariborz Khedmati, one of the two men responding to 
Phyliss's hollering of "Stop thief," pursued the man fleeing 
northward from her on Main Street, at one point coming within 
several feet of him (R. 178 at 125-26). Khedmati asked the man, 
"What did you steal?" The man, who was a Hispanic with a small 
mustache wearing blue jeans and a blue and white shirt (R. 178 at 
137), turned around and began walking backwards facing Khedmati 
and his boss, who kept following. The man said he had stolen 
nothing and told the two pursuers to leave him alone because he 
had a knife in his pocket (R. 178 at 128). Khedmati crossed the 
street to call the police and left his boss to pursue the man (R. 
178 at 126-28). Khedmati identified Defendant as the man he had 
pursued up Main Street in a photo spread a few days later and at 
trial (R. 178 at 129-32). He saw no other people on the street 
besides Defendant, his boss and the Demetropolos sisters (T. 178 
at 136). 
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Suppression Issues: On August 21, 1989, Defendant Maestas was a 
parolee required by the conditions of his parole to refrain from 
consuming alcohol and to be at his residence, 436 Logan Avenue in 
Salt Lake City, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (R. 
178 at 21-22). His parole officer, Scott Carver, went to 
Defendant's residence at approximately 10:30 p.m. to find out if 
Defendant was in compliance with the curfew condition of his 
parole (R. 178 at 23). He was informed by another resident at 
that address that Defendant was not there and probably was at his 
girlfriend's house (R. 178 at 23). After Carver learned from his 
dispatcher that Defendant had not called in to provide a new 
residence address or a reason for his curfew violation, Carver 
and his partner, Agent Kevin Westover, went to the home of 
Defendant's girlfriend, Linda Villagrana (R. 178 at 23). The two 
agents approached the house on foot, and Carver sent Westover to 
the back door of the house, which was straight down the driveway 
(R. 178 at 24). Through the window, Carver saw Defendant running 
to the back of the house and yelled to Westover, "He's coming out 
your door." (R. 178 at 24). As Defendant was opening the back 
door, Westover ordered him to halt, which he did (R. 178 at 48). 
Defendant came out of the house as directed to by Westover (R. 
178 at 48-49), and was arrested for parole violation and 
transported to jail for booking (R. 178 at 24). 
At the jail, Carver noticed a recent cut with dried 
blood on it on the palm of Defendant's hand after Defendant 
complained of it (T. 178 at 175). During the search at the jail 
incident to his arrest, the jailer removed a piece of glass with 
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blood on it from Defendant's pocket and turned it over to 
Westover (R. 178 at 25). The items on Defendant's person, 
including his clothing and a gold chain with a cross with a white 
stone on it, were placed in a sealed plastic bag and kept by the 
jail. 
On August 22 and again a few days later, Carver was 
informed by two city police detectives that Defendant was a 
suspect in a breaking and entering in which glass was broken (R. 
178 at 26). The glass taken from defendant's pocket was turned 
over to Detective Jensen (R. 178 at 26). 
On August 23, Detective Jensen showed the Demetropolos 
sisters a photo spread containing Defendant's picture, and none 
of them could identify him as the man they had seen in their home 
(R. 178 at 35). Fariborz Khedmati, who worked across the street 
from the Demetropoloses, was also shown a photo spread by Jensen 
that day and was able to pick out Defendant as the man he had 
chased after and confronted (R. 178 at 126-29). 
On August 28, before Circuit Court Judge Michael 
Hutchings, Jensen executed an affidavit for a search warrant 
(Def. Ex. 1; Addendum A) authorizing seizure of the clothing and 
the gold chain taken from Defendant during his booking at the 
jail for parole violation. The affidavit contained the following 
statement of facts to establish probable cause: 
The statements of Phyliss Demetroplos, 
and her sisters Sylvia and Helen Demetropolos 
that on the night of 8/21/89 they went to 
Phyliss's home at 14906 South Main Street. 
They discovered the suspect in this case, 
Floyd Maestas, inside the home and chased him 
away. They found a window broken with drops 
of blood. They found a sack of liquor 
bottles and broken glass. They discovered 
the house ransacked and a gold chain with a 
cross containing a white stone missing. A 
neighbor, witness, Fariborz Khedmati, also 
saw Maestas and identified him from a photo 
spread. This information was furnished by 
victims to Officer Akin, SLCPD, whose report 
# 89-87318 was furnished to your affiant and 
used by him. 
Later that evening Kevin Westover, A P&P, 
found the defendant and arrested and booked 
him on an unrelated Probation Violation. 
When he was booked, a piece of bloody glass 
was taken from the defendant's pockets, as 
was a gold chain with a cross with a white 
stone. This information given to your 
affiant by Kevin Westover Ut State Department 
of Corrections. 
Wherefore, your affiant believes that the 
suspect's clothing may be further bloodied 
and the chain, cross and stone should be . 
shown to the victim to see if it is the 
stolen property since they can identify the 
items taken from their house. 
(Def.'s Ex. 1 at p. 2; Addendum A) (emphasis added). After the 
seized gold chain was identified as having been taken in the 
burglary, Detective Jensen executed another affidavit for a 
search warrant on September 7, seeking authorization to draw 
Defendant's blood, with the following statement of supportive 
facts: 
The statements of Phyllis Demetropolis 
and her sisters Sylvia and Helen Demetropolis 
that on the night of 8/21/89 they went home 
at 1496 South Main Street. They discovered 
the suspect in this case, Floyd MAESTAS/ 
inside the home and chased him away. They 
found a broken window with drops of blood on 
the broken window pieces. The pieces of 
broken glass were put into evidence. The 
victims found the house ransacked and a gold 
chain with a cross containing a white stone 
missing. The cross has been seized from 
Maestas and identified as the cross stolen 
from the house. 
Fariborz KHEDMATI also saw Floyd MAESTAS 
and identified him in a photospread. This 
information was furnished by victims to 
-7-
officer AKIN, SLCPD, whose report number 89-
87318 was used by affiant. Affiant has also 
interviewed victims and observed the 
evidence. 
Later that evening Kevin WESTOVER, A P&P, 
found the defendant and arrested and booked 
him on an unrelated probation violation. 
When MAESTAS was booked a piece of glass with 
blood on it was found in the defendant's 
right front pocket. This information was 
given to your affiant by Kevin WESTOVER, Utah 
State Department of Corrections. 
Wherefore your affiant believes the blood 
on the glass found in the victim [sic] 
residence and on the glass shard found in the 
suspect's pocket to the suspect's blood. 
(Def. Ex. 3; Addendum B) (emphasis added). 
On April 11, 1990, Defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the items taken from his person during his booking, claiming that 
his warrantless arrest violated the fourth amendment (R. 57, 61-
68). On April 23, he filed another motion to suppress, 
contending that the seizure of his blood and his belongings at 
the jail was unreasonable under the fourth amendment (R. 87). 
Defendant contended that the warrants authorizing these two 
seizures were issued on the basis of two affidavits containing 
false information, i.e., the sentence emphasized above. 
The suppression motions were heard by the trial court 
on June 6, 1990 (R. 178 at 19-60). At the suppression hearing, 
Jensen testified that the sentence emphasized above in his 
supporting affidavits was not intended to indicate that the 
Demetropolos sisters had identified Maestas in the photo spread, 
only to indicate that, at the time he executed the affidavits, 
Defendant had been identified by Khedmati as the man seen running 
from the Demetropolos home (R. 178 at 50-51). The suppression 
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motions were taken under advisement and eventually denied (R. 98, 
100). 
Speedy Trial Issue: 
Defendant grossly misstates the facts in this case by 
representing to the court that "at no time did defendant, either 
pro se or through his appointed lawyer, move the Court for a 
continuance." (Brief of Appellant at 12). 
Defendant was arrested and jailed for parole violation 
on August 21, 1989 (R. 178 at 24). An information charging him 
with burglary in this case was filed on or about September 12, 
1989 (R. 7). Defendant appeared in circuit court for arraignment 
without counsel on September 21, and counsel was appointed (R. 
3). Attorney Candice Johnson filed her appearance and a 
discovery request on September 25 (R. 3, 27). Johnson appeared 
before Judge Palmer on September 28 and a preliminary hearing was 
set for October 5 (R. 3). On October 5, on Defendant's motion, 
the case was continued and the preliminary hearing rescheduled 
for October 26, apparently for the purpose of conducting a line-
up requested by Defendant (R. 3). On October 16, Johnson filed a 
motion to withdraw because of a conflict of interest (R. 13), and 
Walter Bugden was appointed as counsel (R. 15). On October 26, 
Bugden appeared before Judge Fuchs at the time set for the 
preliminary hearing and requested another continuance in order to 
have a line-up conducted (R. 3; 18). The preliminary hearing was 
continued to November 9 (R. 3). On November 1, 1989, Defendant 
filed a Request for Speedy Trial in the Circuit Court (R. 18-19). 
After a preliminary hearing on November 9, Defendant was bound 
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over and the case was transferred to district court on November 
13, 1989 (R. 4). The record indicates that, at least until that 
date, Defendant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for 
parole violation having nothing to do with the charges in the 
instant case (R. 4; 30; 51). It was not until December 8, 1989 
that an order was issued committing him to the custody of the 
county sheriff on the burglary charges (R. 32). Meanwhile, 
Defendant was arraigned in district court on November 24, at 
which time Defendant appeared and pled not guilty; pretrial was 
set for December 18 and trial for December 21 (R. 31; R. 179 at 
3). 
There is no explanation in the record on appeal for the 
continuance of the December 21 trial date, although counsel for 
the State represented to the trial court at a subsequent hearing 
on the speedy trial issue that Defendant had recfuested a 
continuance on December 21, 1989, and neither Defendant nor his 
counsel at that point contradicted that representation (R. 178 at 
10). 
The next entry in the record of the district court is 
Defendant's handwritten motion for withdrawal of Bugden as 
counsel, filed on January 8, 1990, and based on conflict of 
interest and ineffective assistance (R. 35). Those grounds are 
expanded upon in Defendant's January 1, 1990 letter to Judge 
Sawaya indicating Defendant's dissatisfaction with Bugden's 
decision not to file some pretrial motions (R. 36). In another 
letter filed February 12, 1990 (R. 37), Defendant again asked for 
Bugden's dismissal as his appointed counsel. He also requested 
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an evidentiary hearing on his pro se suppression motion (R. 39-
41) and a continuance of the trial set for February 22, 1990 (R. 
37-38). 
In a minute entry dated February 16, Bugden was allowed 
to withdraw as counsel (R. 45), and the public defender office 
was directed to make arrangements for the next attorney on the 
list to represent Defendant (R. 46). At the next hearing on 
March 9, attorney Kenneth Brown appeared with Defendant (R. 178 
at 1). Attorney Brown indicated he might be filing a formal 
suppression motion (R. 178 at 1). Judge Sawaya struck 
Defendant's improperly filed pro se motions and left Brown free 
to file appropriate ones (R. 178 at 3; R. 48). Defendant voiced 
no objection to this action, and at the end of the hearing 
counsel engaged in the following discussion with the court: 
Mr. Brown: I don't know if the Court wants 
to set a trial date. 
The Court: Not until you have completed your 
pretrial motions. 
Mr. Brown: Okay. Let's just—does the Court 
want to set any kind of date today? 
The Court: If you want to file additional 
motions, you may do so. As soon as you do, 
you will get a hearing as quickly as you file 
them. 
Mr. Brown: All right. 
(R. 178 at 5). 
It was not until April 11, 1990 that Defendant's 
counsel filed a Motion for Discovery pertaining to the out-of-
court identifications of Defendant (R. 54-55), his first motion 
to suppress (R. 57), and a Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Based on Denial of Right to Speedy Trial (R. 49-50). The 
memorandum contained minimal legal analysis and no citations to 
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authorities, but requested dismissal because Defendant's rights 
to a speedy trial and his Notice of Disposition were not 
"scrupulously honored" (R. 49-50). Attached to it were a copy of 
prior counsel's November 1, 1989 Request for Speedy Trial (R. 52-
53) and a copy of a Notice of Disposition letter (R. 51) he 
purportedly sent to the warden of the Utah State Prison on 
October 30, 1989, demanding trial on the pending burglary charge 
within the 120 days set by Utah Code Ann. § 77-2:9-1 (1990) 
(Addendum C). 
A one-sentence motion to dismiss based on the violation 
of Defendant's rights to a speedy trial was fil€*d o.n April 12, 
1990 (R. 69), as well as a memorandum in support of his first 
suppression motion (R. 61-67). A second motion to suppress and a 
supporting memorandum were not filed until April 23, 1990 (R. 87; 
71-86). 
At a hearing held on May 4, 1990, Defendant's discovery 
motion was addressed and granted (R. 178 at 14). Defendant's 
speedy trial motion was also considered. Defendant made no 
mention of or argument based on the federal constitutional 
guarantee of a right to a speedy trial or of the cases enforcing 
it. His sole contention was that he was entitled to dismissal of 
the charges based on a violation of the 120-day limit (R. 9-10), 
presumably that set forth in section 77-29-1. 
Counsel for the State represented, while reviewing her 
court file, that Defendant had requested the continuances granted 
on October 5, October 26, and December 21, 1989, and on February 
16, 1990 (R. 10). The court reviewed the aformentioned dates of 
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counsels' appearances and Defendant's various hearings in the 
circuit court and district court, as well as his pro se 
suppression motions and requests for new counsel in January and 
February 1990, and the March 9 first appearance of new counsel 
(R. 178 at 11-13). He then denied the motion to dismiss, 
stating: 
I don't think I can find on the state of this 
record, that Mr. Maestas' rights to a speedy 
trial have been violated, under these 
circumstances. He's had two attorneys, both 
of whom have had to withdraw for one reason 
or another. You [referring to Mr. Brown] 
have entered your appearance just shortly, 
more than a month ago. I would find that his 
right to a speedy trial has not been 
violated, and his motion is denied. 
(R. 178 at 13). The necessary evidentiary hearing on the 
Defendant's two motions to suppress was then set; when the clerk 
asked defense counsel about June 7, he responded, "June 7 would 
be fine" (R. 178 at 17), and Defendant himself voiced no 
objection to this setting. 
Several days later, on May 14, 1990, Defendant filed a 
stipulation for preparation of the line-up transcript so, as part 
of trial preparation, counsel could make a determination of 
whether to move to quash the identification or develop 
exculpatory evidence (R. 178 at 94-95). 
Hearing on the Defendant's suppression motions was held 
on June 6, 1990 (R. 178 at 19-62), and they were taken under 
advisement (R. 178 at 60). Defense counsel then requested a 
trial date, and counsel for the State suggested late July or 
August (R. 178 at 60-61). The trial court then inquired of 
defense counsel: 
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THE COURT: Do you have any objection to 
those dates? 
MR* BROWN: Without waiving Mr. Maestas' 
claim of speedy trial, I would certainly 
be — no. I mean, I think he has articulated 
that claim. We don't wish to detract from 
that position as well. 
THE COURT: Let's see what date we can find 
and see if he has an objection. 
THE CLERK: July 26th. 
MR. BROWN: Fine. 
(R. 178 at 61). The trial actually commenced on July 25, 1990 
(R. 178 at 63). 
Reasonable Doubt Instruction: 
The trial court declined to give Defendant's proposed 
reasonable doubt instruction (R. 157), instead giving the 
substance of it in Instruction 13 (R. 134; Addendum D). 
Defendant's exception to Instruction 13 was based solely on his 
belief that his proposed instruction more accurately reflected 
the law because it very carefully "tracked" the dissent in State 
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), adopted by the majority of 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 
1989) (R. 341). 
Exclusion of Certain Testimony of Defense Witness: 
Defendant did not file a notice of intent to claim 
alibi and a list of any alibi witnesses to the prosecution before 
trial, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1990). At trial, 
defense counsel previewed his client's defense for the jury by 
explaining that the central issu€* in the case was "who entered 
the house" (R. 178 at 69), that Defendant Maestas was not in the 
burglarized home, and that he would be taking the stand to "bare 
his soul" and explain to the jurors how he came into possession 
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of the stolen gold chain and cross and the bloody glass shard (R. 
178 at 70). 
The first defense witness was Linda Villagrana. She 
testified that on August 21, 1989, Defendant had come to her 
house at 9:00 a.m., had taken her child to Raging Waters at 10:00 
a.m. and had met her at the laundromat at noon, remaining with 
her there until 3:00 p.m., when they returned to her house (R. 
178 at 315). The following questioning ensued: 
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Okay. What happened 
from — did Floyd ever leave your home? If 
so, approximately when? 
A. Well, I don't— 
[PROSECUTOR]: I think before the question is 
answered I would appreciate a bench 
conference. 
THE COURT: All right. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Linda, directing 
your attention to August 21, 1989 in 
observing Mr. Maestas or Floyd, did you 
observe what he was wearing on that day? 
A. Goll, let me see. Blue jeans. 
Q. Okay. Was he wearing a shirt? 
A. I don't think he was. 
Q. Okay. My understanding is that he came 
back to your house later that evening; is 
that correct, around 9:00 or 10:00, something 
like that; is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. When did he come back to your house? 
A. It was—well, when it started getting 
dark, about sometime around there. 
(R« 178 at 315-16). After brief further questioning, Villagrana 
was excused and Defendant took the stand as the only other 
defense witness (R. 178 at 318). 
He testified concerning his actions the afternoon of 
August 21, 1989: just after 3:00 p.m., he had passed out at 
Linda's house from drinking whiskey (R. 178 at 320); he awoke and 
at about 6:30 p.m. went alone to a nearby convenience store, 
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where he ran into an old friend who sold him the gold chain and 
cross for $10.00 (R. 178 at 321-22); the two drank a few beers 
and then started walking to a liquor store (R. 178 at 323); the 
old friend and he stopped near 1496 South Main Street because the 
former said he wanted to get some money at his sister's house (R. 
178 at 324); Defendant waited outside for a few minutes, then 
heard screaming from inside the house and saw his friend come 
running out of the house and up Main Street (R. 178 at 325-26); 
Defendant also ran up Main Street and was chased by Khedmati (R. 
178 at 326). The piece of bloody glass taken from his pocket at 
the jail was from a broken window in the back door at 
Villagrana's house. Defendant said he removed it the evening of 
August 21 to prevent injury to children there, and in doing so 
had cut himself (R. 178 at 327-28, 337). The defense rested at 
the close of Maestas's testimony, and court adjourned for the day 
(R. 178 at 336). 
When court reconvened the next morning, Defendant moved 
for a mistrial based on the court's exclusion oi: any response to 
the question about whether, and at what time, Defendant had left 
her home on the late afternoon of the crime (R. 178 at 337-38). 
Defendant made no proffer concerning what Villagrana would have 
testified to if she had been allowed to respond to the question. 
Defendant did not contend that the court's ruling had resulted in 
a violation of his due process rights. Instead, defense counsel 
argued that there was statutory good cause for failing to give 
notice in accordance with section 77-14-2 (Addendum E) because he 
had not met the witness until the day before trial (R. 178 at 
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337-38). In addition, counsel claimed that notice was excused 
because the State knew of Villagrana's existence and had 
subpoenaed her as a possible witness, and was therefore not 
prejudiced by the lack of prior notice (R. 178 at 338). The 
trial court denied the motion for mistrial, concluding that 
Defendant was nonetheless required by the statute to give the 
State notice of his intent to use Villagrana as an alibi witness 
(R. 178 at 339). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss based on section 77-29-1 because there was good cause for 
the delays in bringing him to trial. Defendant was not denied 
his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the four-part 
test set forth in State v. Trafnyy 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), in 
light of his own responsibility for, or acquiescence in, the 
trial delay and his failure to demonstrate any prejudice. 
No arrest warrant was required by Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573 (1980), for the parole violation committed in the 
presence of defendant's parole officers because no entry of the 
home took place. The affidavits supporting the search warrants 
did not contain an intentionally or recklessly false statement. 
Even if the statement is considered recklessly false or 
misleading, the remaining information in the affidavits is 
sufficient to support probable cause. 
The trial court did not give an erroneous instruction 
on the State's burden of proof and the meaning of reasonable 
doubt in that context. Instruction 13 is a duplicate of the 
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reasonable doubt instruction recently approved of by this court 
as a correct statement of the law on these points. 
The court should decline to reach Defendant's due 
process claim relating to the exclusion of Villagrana's response 
to one question either because the constitutional issue was not 
properly preserved below with a proffer of what the excluded 
testimony would have been, or because the constitutional issue is 
being raised on appeal for the first time. Defendant has not 
argued that this case involves any circumstances that would 
justify his failure to raise this constitutional issue in the 
trial court. 
If the court addresses the issue on the merits, 
Defendant has not demonstrated that he was in fact denied due 
process by the trial court's ruling. There is nothing in the 
record to show what the witness's actual testimony would have 
been if allowed to answer the question. The trial court's 
ruling, imposing a sanction for failure to comply with the 
notice-of-alibi statute, did not hamper or eliminate Defendant's 
presentation of his defense, i.e., that he did not enter the 
burglarized residence. In light of the other evidence 
contradicting the defendant's testimony that he was not in the 
Demetropolos home on August 21, the one item of potential 
corroboration excluded by the court's ruling was not critical to 
the defense. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS BASED ON SECTION 77-29-1(4) BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT ASSERT OR DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF GOOD CAUSE 
WAS ERRONEOUS OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1990) entitles an 
incarcerated person against whom criminal charges are pending to 
a trial on those charges within 120 days of delivery of written 
notice of a demand for disposition of those charges. Subsection 
(2) authorizes the granting of reaonable continuances to either 
the charged defendant or to the prosecuting attorney. Section 
77-29-1(4) provides: 
In the event the charge is not brought to 
trial within 120 days or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed. 
In this case, if we assume that Attorney Budgen's 
Notice of Disposition letter was in fact delivered to the Warden 
on November 1, 1989, the original trial setting of December 21. 
1989 was well within the 120-day period commenced by that 
delivery. See State v. Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974). 
Defendant requested a continuance of that trial date (R. 178 at 
10) and the trial was reset for February 22, 1990, still within 
the original 120 days from November 1. His second attorney, 
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Bugden, was allowed to withdraw on February 16, after Defendant 
requested new counsel, a suppression hearing, and a trial 
continuance in his January and early February 1990 pro se motions 
and correspondence (R. 37-38). 
The motion to dismiss under the statute was not even 
filed until April 12. At the hearing on that motion, the trial 
court determined that Defendant's action in seeking continuances 
and new counsel, approximately two weeks before expiration of the 
original 120-day period, constituted good cause under section 77-
29-1(4) for the prosecuting attorney's failure to bring Defendant 
to trial within that period. 
Defendant asserts that no good cause was shown in this 
case (Brief of Appellant at 12), but does not claim any abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's good cause determinatinon and 
ignores relevant legal authority contrary to his claim. See 
e.g., State v. Valasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982) (statutory 
period is extended by amount of time during which defendant was 
cause of delay); State v. Carlsenf 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 P.2d 326 
(1970) (successive appointments of counsel at defendant's request 
sufficient for good cause). The court should therefore reject 
Defendant's statutory claim and affirm the trial court's denial 
of his section 77-29-1(4) motion to dismiss. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REACH THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIM BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT'S SCANT ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION 
OF THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL TEST TO THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE IS INADEQUATE TO PRESENT THE ISSUE 
FOR THE APPELLATE COURT'S DISPOSITION. 
Defendant asserts on appeal that his federal 
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, focusing on 
the delay between his arrest on charges unrelated to this 
prosecution (Brief af Appellant at 11). He then lists the four 
factors from the applicable balancing test taken from Barker v. 
Winqo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), baldly asserts that three of the 
factors are shown here, without addressing the application of the 
Barker test to the actual facts and proceedings in this case, and 
asks this court to find a constitutional violation based on his 
fifteen sentences of "legal analysis" (Brief of Appellant at 13-
14). 
This court should refuse the invitation to make a 
constitutional ruling on the basis of such incomplete briefing, 
analysis, and argument. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Ct. 
App. 199). 
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POINT III 
UNDER THE APPLICABLE BALANCING TEST, 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, WHERE 
THE DELAY WAS EITHER AT HIS REQUEST OR WITH 
HIS CONSENT OR ACQUIESCENCE, HE ASSERTED THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
ONLY ONCE, AND NO PREJUDICE HAS BEEN SHOWN. 
Under Barker/ four factors should be considered in 
evaluating whether the speedy trial right has been denied: the 
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. State v. 
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1990); State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Ct. App. 1991). 
An arrest warrant was issued for Defendant on 
September 12, 1989 (R. 6), and trial began on July 25, 1990. 
There is no question that this 316-day period is considerable, 
but it is still within the range of delays that have nonetheless 
passed constitutional muster. See State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d at 
708 n.16 (citing various cases with delays ranging from 3h months 
to 4*$ years). 
Turning to the reasons for the delay, the record shows 
that long segments were the result of actions taken by Defendant, 
during which he must be held to have temporarily waived his 
speedy trial right. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1329030 
(Utah 1986); Hoyt, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17; ^ ee Trafny, 799 P.2d 
at 708 n.15. The 42-day period between September 28, on which 
The right is designed to protect three interests: prevention 
of oppressive pretrial detention; minimization of anxiety and 
concern of the accused; and limitation of the possibility that 
the defense will be impaired. Barker v. Wingof 407 U.S. at 532; 
State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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preliminary hearing was set for October 5, and November 9, the 
date on which the preliminary hearing finally took place should 
not weigh against the State. Defendant requested a continuance 
on October 5 in order to conduct a line-up, a process interrupted 
by a change of counsel by Defendant, and the line-up did not 
occur until November 9. In the November 1 Request for Speedy 
Trial (R. 18-19), even defense counsel acknowledged that 
Defendant had temporarily waived his speedy trial right up to 
that point by demanding a line-up prior to the preliminary 
hearing in circuit court, after which he was bound over, on 
November 13, and arraigned, on November 24. At the latter, trial 
was set for December 21. The record reveals no reason for this 
segment of delay. 
Defendant obtained a continuance of the trial date on 
December 21 until February 22, 1990, another 63 days of delay 
attributable to Defendant and not to the State. The 15-day delay 
from February 22 until March 9, the result of Defendant's request 
for new counsel and for a continuance of trial pending hearing on 
his suppression motions, as well as the 89-day period from March 
9 until June 6, during which Defendant agreed to postpone trial 
until after disposition of his potentially dispositive pre-trial 
motions (regarding suppression and an alleged statutory speedy 
trial violation) also should not not be used against the State in 
applying the Barker balancing test. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 707 
(delays from defendant's motions cannot be counted against 
State). 
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At the June 6 hearing when Defendant requested a trial 
date, it was set for July 25. That setting was delayed by 
approximately one month because the prosecutor was already 
scheduled for ten trials in the balance of June and early July 
(R. 178 at 60-61). 
The only affirmative assertion by Defendant of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial appears in the record in 
his November 1, 1989 Request for Speedy Trial (R. 18-19). At all 
other times, Defendant did not raise the issue when hearing dates 
were scheduled, but instead explicitly agreed to the scheduling 
of proceedings, did not act expeditiously in filing or getting to 
hearing his potentially dispositive pretrial motions, and never 
sought a dismissal of the charges against him on the grounds that 
delay had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial 
under the Barker standard. "While Barker made it clear that a 
defendant cannot waive his right to a speedy trial by failing to 
demand it, the factors underlying that failure must be figured 
into the balance." State v. Miller, 747 P.2d at 443 (quoting 
State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 1987)). 
Finally, Defendant does not attempt to show any 
prejudice to him from the delay between his arrest and trial, and 
o 
the record suggests none. 
The record indicates that Defendant was incarcerated due to the 
parole violation from August 21, 1989 until at least November 13, 
1989, but does not reveal whether Defendant was ever in State 
custody as a result of the charges against him in the instant 
case. 
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In light of these facts, and in light of the 
appropriate factors to be balanced, no denial of Defendant's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial occurred. 
POINT IV 
NO WARRANT WAS REQUIRED FOR DEFENDANT'S 
ARREST FOR PAROLE VIOLATION UNDER THE RULE OF 
PAYTON V, NEW YORK BECAUSE THE OFFICERS DID 
NOT ENTER THE HOME TO ARREST HIM. 
Defendant claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated by his warrantless arrest for parole violation at 
Villagrana's home, relying on the Payton v. New York# 445 U.S. 
573 (1980). Under Payton, the police may not make a warrantless, 
consentless entry into a private residence to make a routine 
(i.e., nonexigent) felony arrest even if they could have made 
such a warrantless arrest without entering the residence. 
However, this rule has no application on the facts of this case. 
Defendant contended in the trial court that "under 
Payton there is a requirement to obtain an arrest warrant before 
you actually enter the dwelling to arrest the individual[•]" (R. 
178 at 16). However, as the prosecution contended in the trial 
court (R. 178 at 16), and as even Defendant seems to recognize on 
appeal (Brief of Appellant at 7, 16), the parole officers 
indisputably did not enter the Villagrana home. Defendant was 
confronted by the officers after he had run from the front to the 
back of the house and had opened the rear door. Defendant came 
out of the house at Agent Westover's direction and was arrested 
outside the home. (R. 178 at 24, 48-49). 
As the Court in Payton reiterated, physical entry of a 
person's home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
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fourth amendment is directed. j[d. at 585; accord State v. 
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Because the 
fourth amendment is designed to prevent instrusions into the 
privacy of one's home, warrantless seizures of a suspect inside a 
home are presumptively unreasonable. Paytonf 445 U.S. at 586. 
But, as the Court pointed out, "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a 
firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably by crossed 
without a warrant." ^d. at 590. 
Where, as in the instant case, the threshold is not 
crossed, there is no violation of the sanctity of the home, and 
no warrant is required in order to render the airrest reasonable 
under the fourth amendment. Defendant was thus validly arrested 
for parole violation even though no arrest warrant was obtained, 
and the trial court correctly denied the first motion to suppress 
3 
items seized incident to that arrest. 
3 
There are other serious problems with Defendant's fourth 
amendment claim. For instance, even if there had been entry by 
the parole officers to arrest him, the record does not disclose a 
basis for Defendant's standing to assert any privacy interest in 
Villagrana's home. More importantly, even if he had established 
his standing, police need not obtain a warrant to enter a 
parolee's home to effectuate an arrest if there is reasonable 
cause to believe there has been a parole violation. United 
States v, Cardona, 903 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1990) (following Griffin 
v. Illinois, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). 
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POINT V 
THE AFFIDAVITS SUPPORTING THE SEIZURE OF THE 
ITEMS TAKEN FROM DEFENDANT'S PERSON AT 
BOOKING AND OF HIS BLOOD SAMPLE DID NOT 
CONTAIN A FALSE REPRESENTATION; EVEN IF THIS 
COURT DETERMINED OTHERWISE, THE AFFIDAVITS 
CONTAINED AMPLE SUPPORT FOR A FINDING OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE IF THE ERRONEOUS MATERIAL IS 
EXCISED, 
Defendant next challenges the validity of the warrants 
authorizing seizure of his blood sample, and the clothing and 
gold chain held by the jail as his personal property after 
booking• First, he claims, the statement by the affiant officer 
in the supporting affidavits (Addendum A and B, quoted in full in 
Appellee's Statement of Facts, supra) that "They [i.e., the 
Demetropolos sisters] discovered the suspect in this case, Floyd 
Maestas, inside the home and chased him away" is false. Second, 
if this false statement is taken out of the afffidavits, 
Defendant avers, the affidavit is "devoid" of probable cause. 
(Brief of Appellant at 17). 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), the 
United States Supreme Court held that if a defendant shows by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an affiant made an 
intentionally or recklessly false statement to obtain a warrant, 
the false material must be excised from the affidavit and 
probable cause determined on the basis of the remaining content. 
If the remaining content is insufficient to establish probable 
cause, the warrant is invalid. Id.; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 
284, 288 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As formulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court, if an omission or misstatement materially affects the 
finding of probable cause, any evidence obtained pursuant to the 
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warrant must be suppressed. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 
(Utah 1986). 
As the prosecution argued to the trial court (R. 178 at 
59), the statement challenged as false by Defendant can 
reasonably be read in the context of the entire statement of 
supportive facts as a naming of the suspect as Floyd Maestas by 
the affiant for the benefit of the reviewing judge, not as an 
erroneous indication to the judge that the Demetropolos sisters 
had identified Maestas as the man they discovered in and chased 
from their home. Significantly, Jensen did not state that the 
women had "identified" the man in their home as Maestas, which 
would have undeniably conveyed the false message that they had 
seen a man in their home whom they had later identified as being 
Maestas. 
The other reasonable reading of the sentence under 
attack is that which Jensen testified he intended to convey, 
namely, that the suspect chased away from the Demetropolos home 
had, by the time the affidavits were executed, been identified by 
someone as Maestas. This is a true statement since, as Jensen 
stated a few sentences later in the affidavits, Khedmati had 
identified Maestas in the photo spread on August 23, 1989 (R. 178 
at 50-51). Thus, although the sentence could have been drafted 
in other ways to be clearer about its intended message, the trial 
court could properly find that Jensen had not made a false 
statement in the affidavits intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly. 
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Even if this court were to conclude otherwise from the 
face of the affidavits, it is clear that the affidavits contain 
ample support for a determination of probable cause if the 
misleading naming of Maestas as the suspect was taken out, so 
that the challenged sentence read: "They discovered a man inside 
the home and chased him away." Thus, any false information 
conveyed in the challenged sentence did not materially affect the 
determination of probable cause. Defendant does not make any 
attempt to demonstrate the contrary. "The obvious purpose of 
Franks and its progeny is to avoid suppressing evidence when the 
actual facts, if known to the magistrate, would have resulted in 
a finding of probable cause." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. 
Therefore, on either of these two bases, this court 
should conclude that the search warrants were valid and that the 
trial court thus correctly denied Defendant's second motion to 
suppress. 
POINT VI 
THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION GIVEN TO THE 
JURY IS IDENTICAL TO THAT RECENTLY UPHELD BY 
THIS COURT IN STATE V, PEDERSEN AS A CORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW. 
Defendant claimed in the trial court (R. 178 at 341) 
and in his brief on appeal (Brief of Appellant at p. 18) that the 
trial court committed reversible error by giving Instruction 13 
(Addendum C) instead of the reasonable doubt instruction he 
proposed. He does not point to any particular errors or 
omissions in the instruction given, but claims that his own 
proposed instruction better "tracks" current case law on the 
subject, specifically, State v. Ireland,, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 
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(Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting), and State v. Johnsonf 774 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989). 
However, three weeks before Appellant's brief was 
filed, this court issued State v. Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 
(Ct. App. 1990), which involved a similar challenge to an 
identical reasonable doubt instruction, iji. at 12; cf. 
Instruction 13 at R. 134 (Addendum D to Appellee's Brief). The 
court held that the instruction given was a correct statement of 
law that complied with the requirements enunciated in Johnson and 
Ireland. Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv, Rep. at 12. Cf. Cage v. 
Louisianna# U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 328 (1990) (invalidating 
instruction equating reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty" 
and "actual substantial doubt"). Therefore, the trial court did 
not err in giving that instruction to the jury, even if the 
reasonable doubt instruction proposed by defendant but not given 
was also proper. Jd. For the same reasons, this court should 
reject the claim that the trial court in the instant case erred 
in giving Instruction 13. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS CLAIM BECAUSE HE 
WAIVED IT BY NOT RAISING IT FIRST IN THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
On appeal, Defendant asserts that his conviction should 
4 
be reversed because he was denied his due process right to 
4 
Although Defendant alludes on appeal to a due process right 
under the Utah Constitution, he makes no argument on state 
constitutional grounds and suggests no analysis distinct from 
that applicable to the federal due process provision. The State 
therefore addresses only the federal constitutional claim. See 
State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
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present a defense when the trial court refused to allow Linda 
Villagrana to say whether and when he had left her home on the 
late afternoon of the crime (Brief of Appellant at p. 18). 
Defendant made no such contention in the trial court, either 
during or after trial. He also does not contend that the trial 
court's evidentiary ruling constitutes plain error, or that a 
liberty interest is at stake and there are exceptional 
circumstances justifying his failure to present his 
constitutional claim first to the trial court for its 
determination. See State v. Jameson, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1990); State v. Harrison, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Because he did not present any due process claim first to the 
trial court, Defendant should be deemed to have waived this 
constitutional claim and the court should not reach the merits of 
the issue. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985). 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REACH THE MERITS 
OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROFFER ON THE TRIAL 
RECORD THE CONTENT OF THE EXCLUDED TESTIMONY 
MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE APPELLATE COURT 
TO DETERMINE AS A PRELIMINARY MATTER WHETHER 
IT WAS ACTUALLY CORROBORATIVE OF A PORTION OF 
HIS DEFENSE. 
At the outset, it should be noted that Defendant does 
not contend that the notice of alibi statute, Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-14-2 (1990) (Addendum E), is unconstitutional on its face. 
4 4 
Cont. Cont. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
5 
Notice-of-alibi statutes have withstood facial challenges on 
due process grounds where, like section 77-14-2(3), they do not 
prevent a noncomplying Defendant from testifying in support of 
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Nor does he contend that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to find that Defendant had established good cause for 
his failure to comply with the statute. Instead, Defendant 
merely asserts he was denied due process because the trial 
court's evidentiary ruling prevented him from presenting a 
defense, without demonstrating how his defense was impaired when 
Linda Villagrana was not allowed to answer one question about 
whether and when Defendant had left her company the afternoon of 
the burglary. 
Defendant made no proffer concerning what Jillagrana's 
response to either part of the question would have been. He now 
claims that the trial court committed reversible error in 
excluding this testimony, whatever it may have been. Under Rule 
103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a party cannot challenge as 
erroneous a trial court's ruling excluding evidence unless "the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or 
was apparent from the context within which questions were asked." 
This requirement is essential to the appellate process. Only if 
the substance of the excluded evidence appears in the record can 
the appellate court determine first, whether the ruling was 
erroneous, and second, if the error was harmful. See State v. 
Cont. Cont. his own alibi defense, Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 81-82 and 1908 (1970), and if they evenhandedly require 
the State to disclose its alibi rebuttal witnesses, Wardius v. 
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); see generally Annotation, "Validity 
and Construction of Statute Requiring Defendant in Criminal Case 
to Disclose Matter as to Alibi Defense," 45 A.L.R.3d 958 (1972). 
6
 Cf. State v. Bias, 393 So.2d 677 (La. 1981). 
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Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986); see also Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1980). 
As discussed in full below, Defendant's due process 
claim can only succeed on the merits if he can show that the 
excluded testimony was vital to his defense because of its 
exculpatory, corroborative, or other favorable nature. However, 
the court has no way of knowing what the content of the excluded 
testimony would have been. Asked if and when defendant left her 
house, it is completely plausible that Villagrana would have 
finished her interrupted response, "Well, I don't . . . " (R. 178 
at 315) with the word "know," completely vitiating any claim by 
Defendant that the trial court excluded testimony favorable to 
the defense. For this reason alone, the court should decline to 
reach the merits of Defendant's due process claim. See 
Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 404 Mass. 61, 533 N.E.2d 638, 640 
(1989). 
POINT IX 
IF THE COURT NONETHELESS REACHES THE MERITS 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, THERE WAS NO 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS RESULTING FROM THE 
EVIDENTIARY RULING ENFORCING THE NOTICE-OF-
ALIBI STATUTE SANCTION BECAUSE: (1) THE 
EXCLUDED TESTIMONY WAS OTHERWISE PRESENTED TO 
THE JURY; AND (2) EVEN IF THE COURT ASSUMES 
THE EXCLUDED TESTIMONY WAS FAVORABLE TO 
DEFENDANT, IT WAS NOT CRITICAL TO THE DEFENSE 
PRESENTED 
Although Defendant made no record proffer of whether 
Villagrana would have testified that Defendant did leave her home 
the late afternoon of the burglarly, a subsequent question 
directed to her by counsel suggested that Villagrana's testimony 
would have been that Defendant had in fact left: 
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Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Okay. My 
understanding is that he came back to your 
house later that evening; is that correct, 
around 9:00 or 10:00, something like that; is 
that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. When did he come back to your house? 
A. It was—well, when it started getting 
dark, about sometime around there. 
(R. 178 at 316). Thus, the only testimony actually excluded by 
the trial court for noncompliance with section 77-14-2's 
requirements concerned what time Defendant had left Villagrana's 
7 
home. This information was provided to the jury through 
Defendant's own subsequent testimony that he left her house at 
approximately 6:30 p.m. and went to a convenience store (R. 178 
at 321). Since the information sought from Villagrana but 
excluded was nonetheless presented to the jury, it is difficult 
to see how the trial court's ruling could have had anything but a 
negligible effect on the presentation of the defense. See State 
v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1202 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant's entire due process argument consists of a 
description of three distinguishable United States Supreme Court 
cases, all involving the application of a per se state statute or 
rule to exclude evidence that was clearly exculpatory or 
otherwise material and favorable to the defense put forth at 
The prosecution put on no direct evidence of the time at which 
the Demetropolos house was broken into. On cross-examination, 
Sylvia Demetropolos indicated that a neighbor had told her of 
hearing breaking glass around 5:00-5:30 p.m. on August 21 (R. 178 
at 117), but the neighbor was not called as a witness by either 
party. 
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trial. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967), the 
Court held that the sixth amendment right to compulsory process 
was violated by a state law absolutely prohibiting a convicted 
accomplice from testifying on behalf of a co-accomplice. 
Washington was accused of murder. His defense was that his 
accomplice, Fuller, had taken a gun from him and fired it at the 
victim, after Washington unsuccessfully had tried to prevent the 
shooting. Washington testified to this version of the shooting 
episode, but the trial court refused, pursuant to state law, to 
9 
allow him to call Fuller to corroborate his story. Pointing out 
that Fuller was the only person besides Washington who knew what 
had happened, the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
Washington's due process rights were violated by the statute's 
absolute bar to Fuller's testimony, which the Court characterized 
as relevant, material and vital to the defense. Id. 
A few years later, the Court again reversed a murder 
conviction on due process grounds where the trial court had 
barred the defendant from (a) cross-examining his own witness, 
McDonald, about the witness's repudiation of a confession to the 
o 
Defendant's thin "argument" on his due process claim, Brief of 
Appellant at 18-21, contains completely inadequate legal and 
factual analysis, providing the court with an additional reason 
for not reaching the merits of the constitutional issue. See 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
g 
The Court did not have to speculate about what Fuller would 
have said if allowed to testify: 
The record indicated that Fuller would have 
testified that [Washington] pulled at him and 
tried to persuade him to leave, and that 
[Washington] ran before Fuller fired the 
fatal shot. 
Washington# 388 U.S. at 23. 
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murder, applying the voucher rule that prohibits cross-
examination of your own witness unless adverse, or (b) 
introducing testimony from three other witnesses to whom McDonald 
had separately admitted shooting the victim, applying the rule 
against admission of hearsay. Chambers v. Mississippif 410 U.S. 
284, 294 (1973). Because this testimony was critical to 
Chambers' defense that McDonald, not he, had shot the victim, id. 
at 289, 302, his conviction was reversed. Notwithstanding this 
result, the Court was careful to point out that even the 
important right of a criminal defendant to call and cross-examine 
witnesses may have to bend to the legitimate interests of the 
State in the criminal trial process: 
Few rights are more fundamental than 
that of an accused to present witnesses in 
his own defense. In the exercise of this 
right, the accused, as is required of the 
State, must comply with established rales of 
procedure and evidence designed to assure 
both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence. 
Id. at 302 (citations omitted). 
Finally, in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), a 
divided Court reversed the manslaughter conviction of a woman who 
was herself barred by a per se state rule from testifying to the 
events leading up to the shooting of her husband during a 
domestic dispute because her recollection of them had been 
hypnotically refreshed. The defendant and the dead victim were 
As in Washington/ 388 U.S. at 23, and Chambers, 410 U.S. at 
287-88, 292-93, but unlike the instant case, the content of the 
excluded testimony was made a part of the record in Rock, 483 
U.S. at 48 n.4. 
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the only ones present during the incident. After hypnosis, she 
remembered that she had held the gun to protect herself but never 
pulled the trigger and that the defective gun had discharged when 
her husband grabbed her arm. The Court recognized Rock's right 
to testify in her own behalf, jud. at 49, and held that the sixth 
amendment gives a defendant the right to call all witnesses whose 
testimony is "material and favorable to his defense." Id. at 52 
(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 
(1982)). 
The circumstances of the instant case are, however, 
like those presented in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 
S.Ct. 646 (1988), in which the Court rejected a defendant's 
contention that he was denied the right to compulsory process, 
and thus due process, when the trial court exercised the 
discretion granted by a notice-of-alibi statute similar to our 
own and excluded his proposed witness at his attempted murder 
trial because of noncompliance with pretrial notice requirements. 
The excluded testimony, which was presented to the trial court 
outside the jury's presence for the admissibility ruling, was 
that the witness had seen the victim's brother with a gun just 
before the shooting. This would have corroborated one item of 
the defendant's version, testified to by two defense witnesses, 
that the victim's brother, and not he, had fired the shots. Id., 
108 S.Ct. at 650. On the other hand, several prosecution 
witnesses had testified that the defendant had a gun, had shot 
the victim in the back as he fled, and had pointed the gun at the 
victim's head as he lay on the ground, but the gun had misfired. 
Id., 108 S.Ct. at 649. 
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In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court stressed 
that notice-of-alibi rules enhance the fairness of the adversary 
system by helping to insure that judgments are not founded on 
partial or speculative factual presentations due to a party's 
surprise at trial. Ld., 108 S.Ct at 653 & n.l6« 
The adversary process could not function 
effectively without adherence to rules of 
procedure that govern the orderly 
presentation of facts and arguments to 
provide each party with a fair opportunity to 
assemble and and submit evidence to 
contradict or explain the opponent's case. 
. . . The State's interest in the orderly 
conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to 
justify the imposition and enforcement of 
firm, though not always inflexible, rales 
relating to the identification and 
presentation of evidence. 
Id., 108 S.Ct. at 653. The Stater's interest in protecting itself 
from an "eleventh hour defense," previously described in Williams 
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970), as "both obvious and 
legitimate," is only one component of the broader public interest 
in full and truthful disclosure. Id., 108 S.Ct. at 654. 
Pretrial discovery of alibi witnesses minimizes the risk that a 
judgment will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even 
deliberately fabricated testimony. Id., 108 S.Ct at 654 & 
n. 1/. 
The Court flatly rejected the argument, which seems to 
be Defendant's position in this case, that no sanction excluding 
a surprise alibi witness could be imposed consistent with the 
The Court found it reasonable to presume that there is 
"something suspect about a defense witness who is not identified 
until after the eleventh hour has passed." Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 
655. 
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sixth amendment's compulsory process clause, emphasizing that the 
accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that 
is inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. ][d., 108 S.Ct. 
at 653, 
Thus, in Washington, Chambers, and Rock, the Court 
determined that the corroborative or exculpatory testimony the 
defendants sought to introduce was so critical to the defense 
that its exclusion resulted in a denial of the sixth amendment 
right to compulsory process and a concomitant denial of due 
process. The corroborative testimony in Taylor, however, was not 
considered critical. 
The differing results can be harmonized if we focus on 
the integrity of the factfinding process and examine the nature 
of the testimony before the respective juries as well as that 
kept from the juries by the trial courts' exclusionary rulings. 
In Washington, the excluded testimony was the only direct 
eyewitness evidence of how the killing occurred, other than that 
from the defendant himself. In Chambersf the excluded testimony 
was the only evidence available to discredit McDonald's 
repudiation of his prior confession that he was the one who fired 
the fatal shots. In Rock, the excluded hypnotically refreshed 
testimony of the defendant was the only direct eyewitness 
evidence. The trial courts' evidentiary rulings left the 
factfinders with either no direct evidence of who had committed 
the crimes or only that of the eyewitness who was on trial. 
Secondly, there is nothing to suggest in these three cases to 
suggest that the prosecution was unaware of the proposed 
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testimony before trial. In contrast, in Taylor there were 
several other available eyewitnesses to the shooting. Despite 
the exclusion of testimony by defendant's surprise alibi witness, 
the factfinders had before them some eyewitness testimony that 
defendant had actually shot the victim, as well as the 
conflicting testimony of two defense witnesses that the victim's 
brother, and not defendant Taylor, had been armed and had fired 
the shots. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649. 
More importantly, the excluded testimony in Washington, 
Chambers , and Rock—if believed by the factfinders—would have 
completely exonerated the defendants of the crimes charged. The 
excluded testimony in Taylor, however, even if believed by the 
jury, would only have corroborated part of the defense's version 
of what happened, i.e., that the victim's brother had been armed. 
It would not have provided the only direct evidence of who had 
fired the shots at the victim. Two different versions of that 
were already before the jury. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the one item of 
Villagrana testimony precluded by the trial court's challenged 
evidentiary ruling—even if this court was willing to speculate 
and assume that it was favorable to Defendant—would only have 
corroborated Defendant's claim that he was in her home until 
about 6:30 p.m. It would have told the jury nothing about the 
other critical portions of his defense, i.e., that he had not 
entered the Demetropolos home and that the glass in his pocket 
was from Villagrana's broken window. Therefore, even if it had 
been admitted and believed by the factfinder, Villagrana's 
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testimony would not have compelled the conclusion that that 
Defendant was innocent of the crime charged. 
In accordance with section 77-14-2(3), application of 
the notice-of-alibi statute to exclude Villagrana's response to 
one narrow question about the time of Defendant's departure did 
not prevent Defendant from testifying to the same as one small 
part of his version of events. His defense was that he was not 
the person who entered the Demetropolos home and took the gold 
chain and cross. He explained his presence at the burglary scene 
and his possession of the stolen gold chain and cross by relating 
the following: At 6:30 p.m., after waking up from passing out, 
he went alone from Villagrana's house to a convenience store, ran 
into a friend who sold him the gold chain cheap, drank some, then 
accompanied this friend to the area of the Demetropolos home, 
waited outside on the sidewalk for him to get some money from his 
sister for more liquor, then heard screaming and shouting, saw 
his friend run away down Main Street, and himself started running 
down Main Street, pursued by the women and by two men from across 
the street who were attracted by the commotion. According to 
Defendant, the bloodied glass in his pants pocket came from a 
broken window at Villagrana's home. 
There were, as in Taylor, other available eyewitnesses 
to the criminal activity who provided differing direct evidence 
concerning Defendant's presence in the Demetropolos home. Sylvia 
Demetropolos identified Defendant as the man she saw in her home 
and watched running out of the house and down the street (R. 178 
at 92). Khedmati also identified Defendant unequivocably as the 
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man he chased away from the Demetropolos home (R. 178 at 131), 
and none of the witnesses who saw the burglar and chased after 
him saw any other man resembling Defendant and wearing similar 
clothes who could have been the anonymous friend testified to by 
Defendant. 
In addition, the State's expert conducted two tests to 
compare the density and refractive index of the piece of glass 
taken from Defendant's pocket (State's Ex. 5) with those of a 
large bloodied piece of broken window glass found on the kitchen 
counter of the Demetropolos home (State's Ex. 6) and from the 
broken window at Villagrana's home (State's Ex. 7). These tests 
indicated that Exhibits 5 and 6 were consistent in density and 
could have come from a common origin (R. 178 at 253, 255). On 
the other hand, the same tests showed that Exhibit 5 and 7 had 
different densities and different refractive indices, indicating 
that the pieces of glass from Defendant's pocket and from 
Villagrana's broken window did not share a common origin (R. 178 
at 257-258). Defendant did not present any contradictory expert 
testimony. 
Finally, a medical technologist expert in blood typings 
conducted seven different tests on the blood taken from Defendant 
(State's Ex. 10) and the blood on the large piece of broken glass 
retrieved from the Demetropolos kitchen counter (State's Ex. 6). 
Five of those tests showed the blood type of both blood samples— 
found in only 11.36 percent of the population (R. 178 at 272) as 
typed in one of the five tests and in only 3.3 percent of the 
population as typed in another of the tests (R. 178 at 274)—to 
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be consistent, while the other two tests were inconclusive (R. 
178 at 271-72). The expert testified that only .16 of the 
population would have the five typings found in the blood drawn 
from Defendant and that on the large piece of broken glass (R. 
178 at 274). The two blood-typing tests that could be performed 
on the small quantity of blood on the shard removed from 
Defendant's pocket (State's Ex. 5) also showed consistent typing 
with blood drawn from Defendant and that on the large piece of 
glass found in the Demetropolos kitchen (R. 178 at 175). 
In light of this uncontroverted evidence pointing to 
Defendant as the person who broke into the Demetropolos home, 
ransacked the house, took the gold chain, and fled upon 
discovery, there is simply no basis for concluding that Defendant 
was denied due process by the trial court's exclusion of what may 
or may not have corroborated his version of the time he left her 
I 
household. Even if we assume that Villagrana, Defendant's 
girlfriend and the custodian of his child (R. 178 at 328), would 
have corroborated the part of his story in which he remained at 
her house until 6:30 p.m., her testimony on this point would not 
have constituted a material and vital part of his defense. 
When the content of Defendant's actual defense is 
examined, it becomes apparent that the exclusion of Villagrana's 
possible "eleventh hour" testimony about what time he left her 
home had no significant impact on Defendant's presentation of his 
defense, and Defendant has pointed out none. This court should 
therefore conclude that Defendant's due process rights were not 
violated by the trial court's evidentiary ruling sanctioning 
Defendant for failure to comply with section 77-14-2. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this 
court affirm the judgments of conviction. 
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